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PROLOGUE
I am from Hawai'i, America's fiftieth state. I am a third
generation Japanese-American. At the turn of the last century,
my grandparents hoped to better their hard life in Japan and
emigrated to work on Hawai'i's sugar plantations. In response
to oppressive work and living conditions, my grandfather
helped a fledging union fight the White plantation owners who
controlled all the political and economic life in the territory. He
was branded a trouble-maker and a traitor. He was forced to
flee and change his family name.
. Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i.
Co-authors Yamamoto, Serrano, Fenton and Gifford are co-founders of the Racial
Justice Center. The Prologue, written in the first person, is authored by Professor
Yamamoto. This personal account opened his presentation at the "Civil Rights in the
New Decade" Symposium, sponsored by the Cumberland Law Review, the Cumberland
School of Law, and the Birmingham Civil Rights Institute, on February 15, 2001.
Thurgood Marshall Fellow, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San
Francisco Bay Area; J.D. 1998, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of
Hawai'i.
Law Clerk, Hawai'i Supreme Court; J.D. 1998, Hastings College of the Law.
Law Clerk to the Honorable Steven H. Levinson, Hawai'i Supreme Court; J.D.
1999, University of Arizona School of Law.
Executive Director, Hawai'i Appleseed Public Interest Law Center; Associate,
Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing; Member, Hawai'i Advisory Committee to the United States
Commission on Civil Rights.
Executive Director, Hawai'i Civil Rights Commission; Co-founder, Na L6io
No Ni Kanaka -The Lawyers for the People of Hawai'i.
Staff Attorney, Hawai'i Civil Rights Commission.; J.D. 1999, William S.
Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i.
CUMBERLAND LAW RE VIEW
At the same time, Hawai'i's indigenous peoples, Native
Hawaiians, struggled for survival. They had their sovereign
nation illegally overthrown with direct U.S. military support.
They lost their homelands. Indeed, the U.S. took all Hawaiian
government lands-one-third of all lands of the territory. Na-
tive Hawaiians had their language barred and customs deni-
grated and were characterized as uncivilized; and they were
decimated by western disease. Hawai'i became largely popu-
lated by White Americans and immigrant workers of color.1
When I was eighteen, just learning about life, I went to a
beautiful, isolated beach. Waimanalo is where many Native
Hawaiians live on specially designated Hawaiian Homelands
(in 1921 the U.S. returned some lands in trust for Native Ha-
waiians who were then seen as a "dying race"). 2 Waimnalo is
culturally rich and economically poor. As I walked, I met a
Hawaiian elder, who looked cautiously at me and asked, "Why
are you here?" She startled me. Was she asking if I was lost?
Did she know I lived in a nearby town? Only later did I realize
that she was really asking if I, as an American with Asian im-
migrant roots, understood what it meant to stand on native
lands; did I understand the Hawaiian struggle to deal with the
consequences of culture destruction and the loss of nation-
hood?
Since that time, wherever I go, I ask myself, "Why are you
here?" Not because I am lost, but because of the importance of
place and history to peoples' spirit, daily concerns and larger
goals.
It is in this light, I say to you, I am honored to be here with
the Birmingham Civil Rights Institute and Cumberland Law
School to talk with you and mutually share learning. Birming-
ham has such a rich history of justice struggle. And in my
I See generally TOM COFFMAN, A NATION WITHIN (1998); LILIKALA
KAME"ELEHIWA, NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIRES -PEHEA LA E PONO Ai? (1992).
2 In 1920, Prince Jonah Kuhio, the then-Territory's sole delegate to Congress,
testified before the full U.S. House of Representatives that unless conditions improved
the Hawaiian race would "pass from the face of the earth." 59 CONG. REC. 7453 (1920)
(statement of Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalanian'ole). The Hawaiian Homes Commission
Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 76-34, 42 Stat. 108 (1921) was thereafter enacted in an effort to
"rehabilitate" Native Hawaiians by returning them to their ancestral lands. See H.R.
REP. No. 839, 66th Cong., at 3-4 (2d. Sess. 1920) (testimony of Senator John H. Wise of
the Legislative Commission of the Territory of Hawai'i to the House of Representa-
tives). The promise of the Hawaiian Homelands, however, has been problematic, as
the program from its inception has been plagued by a lack of resources, questionable
transfers and exchanges of land, and a decades-long waiting list. See S. REP. No. 424,
106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000).
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learning I honor the African Americans and their friends who
struggled in the schools, workplaces, lunch counters, buses,
and streets for civil rights so that all might benefit.
The conference organizers tell me also that I am here be-
cause my frontline and scholarly civil and human rights work,
and the diverse civil rights work of this article's co-authors,
crosses racial, geographic, and national boundaries. In our
work toward justice, we engage the difficult task of trying to
build bridges over the divides of race, citizenship status, gen-
der, sexual orientation, age, and disability. Civil rights, we
have come to see, start with African American justice and now
also reach out like branches on a large tree to connect many
others struggling for just treatment in America.3
With these experiences as a background, my presentation
for the "Civil Rights in the New Decade Symposium" and this
collaborative article focus on the pressing need for progressives
to cross traditional boundaries of race, national origin, and citi-
zenship and, additionally, gender, sexual orientation and dis-
ability and forge lasting alliances to combat the hugely success-
ful, orchestrated twenty-year conservative assault on civil
rights. Border-crossing and alliance-forging by "those commit-
ted to genuine equality," which is how we define "progres-
sive," has always been difficult. Now, it is even harder, and
3 To make this more concrete, racially, we co-authors are Americans of Japa-
nese, Filipino, Asian Indian, Korean, Puerto Rican, Caucasian, Hawaiian and Chinese
ancestry. Our work includes serving on the legal team successfully reopening the
infamous World War Il Japanese American Korematsu internment case, which fueled
the reparations movement; serving as procedural consultant in the human rights class
action on behalf of 10,000 torture and murder victims of the Ferdinand Marcos regime
in the Philippines; serving as co-counsel on behalf of Hawaiian Homelands trust bene-
ficiaries in their successful suit against the state; participation with a working group
researching and advocating for African American reparations for slavery and Jim
Crow segregation; establishing an immigrant rights center that primarily serves Asian
and Pacific Island immigrants, with special emphasis on domestic violence; represent-
ing a Filipino American in his Title VII discrimination challenge; organizing students
around voter initiatives; providing student legal services to Native Americans; serv-
ing on the legal team challenging racial discrimination in University admissions;
organizing against the "Racial Privacy Initiative" in California designed to prevent
the collection of race data; challenging unlawful INS arrest and deportation practices
on behalf of immigrants; participating in redistricting efforts for African American
communities; inaugurating a public interest educational and advocacy "Appleseed"
program; orchestrating Asian American organizational support for Native Hawaiian
sovereignty; defending Hawaiian Homelands Trust beneficiaries in suit to dismantle
all government-supported Hawaiian programs; serving on advisory board to U.S Civil
Rights Commission; testifying before the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights regarding contemporary forms of racial discrimination in the United States;
organizing against California's Proposition 209; organizing and training law students
to represent immigrants and farm workers.
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more important, because of the largely anti-civil rights posture
of the new presidential administration, with John Ashcroft's
ascension to Attorney General and Theodore Olsen's appoint-
ment as Solicitor General.
This jointly written article is divided into two parts. The
first section is a close look at the on-going conservative legal-
political effort to dismantle civil rights -how it is being
achieved piece by piece through the federal courts and state
legislatures and voter initiatives and how this dismantling
hurts all communities. The second section begins to address
how progressive racial communities might build alliances
among themselves and with White Americans committed to
justice in the face of continuing civil rights retrenchment.
Eric K. Yamamoto
INTRODUCTION: SANDOVAL AND THE ATTACK ON CIVIL
RIGHTS
During the 2000 presidential election, Americans awoke to a
startling reality -the politics of law. Through the uproar, we
glimpsed a legal world of Supreme Court decisions split along
ideological lines.
This politics of law, which disenfranchised many African
American voters, 4 also drives the on-going attack on civil
rights. During the past twenty years, Republican-appointed
federal judges, supported by conservative think tanks and ad-
vocacy groups, have dismantled hard-earned civil rights for
African Americans and other racial groups.5 That process has
accelerated now in Alexander v. Sandoval,6 a case awaiting final
4 See e.g., Florida Vote Prompts Demand for Investigation/Black Leaders Demand An-
swer to Florida Vote Questions, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 16, 2000, at Al (reporting that many of
the precincts affected by voting irregularities were predominantly Black).
See generally Angela Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twenti-
eth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL L. REV. 1923 (2000); Frances L. Ansley, Stirring the Ashes:
Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993 (1989); see
JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, No MERCY: How CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS
AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL AGENDA 139-54 (1996).
6 197 F.3d 484, reh'g en banc denied, 211 F.3d 133 (11th Cir.), cert. granted sub norn.
Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 28 (2000). The attack on civil rights enforcement
intensifies with the proposed ballot initiative, dubbed by its proponents as the "Racial
Privacy Initiative," amending the California Constitution to prohibit the state from
collecting data on race, ethnicity, color, or national origin in the operation of public
education, public contracting or public employment. Race, Ethnicity, Color or National
Origin Classification, Initiative for Constitutional Amendmnent (cleared for petition circu-
lation by California Attorney General April 2001). Under the mantle of "colorblind-
ness," this initiative would prohibit the state from gathering data needed to enforce
[Vol. 31:523
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decision by the United States Supreme Court.
Sandoval is significant because it involves the Alabama gov-
ernment's quiet attempt to knock out a cornerstone of the
1960s' civil rights edifice. More specifically, the case threatens
the basic right of individual victims to sue under Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act to ensure that federal dollars do not sub-
sidize "disparate impact" discrimination by states or private
businesses.7
The facts of Sandoval are deceptively simple. Partly in re-
sponse to an increasing Latino population, Alabama voters
amended the state constitution to establish English as the "offi-
cial language of the State of Alabama." 8 The amendment re-
quired the Alabama legislature to "take all steps necessary" to
preserve and enhance the role of English as the common lan-
guage of the State. 9 The Motor Vehicles Department then
stopped its decade-long practice of administering driver's li-
cense exams in fourteen languages and gave its tests in English
only, effectively disqualifying limited proficiency English read-
ers, including those capable of reading street signs. 10 The state
justified English-only testing on grounds of safety, even though
there had been no safety problems under the past multilingual
system and even though the department allowed foreign li-
civil rights, monitor discrimination and hate crimes, address the unique healthcare
and educational needs of different communities, and conduct meaningful studies on
the effectiveness of anti-discrimination laws and other efforts to provide equal oppor-
tunity and ensure diversity.
7 See infra note 121-25 and accompanying text (describing "disparate impact"
discrimination and its legal treatment). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohib-
its discrimination based on race, color or national origin by federally funded entities.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (1994). Congressional authority for Title VI is derived from
the Constitution's Spending Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Title VI contains two sepa-
rate sections that provide different enforcement mechanisms. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et
seq. Under section 601 of Title VI, private citizens may file a private lawsuit challeng-
ing the discriminatory actions of any recipient of federal funds. See Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1985). In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court im-
posed a high standard of proof under section 601 by requiring a plaintiff to demon-
strate that the recipient has consciously discriminated against minority groups. See
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). Under section 602 of
Title VI, the Supreme Court has held that agencies have the authority to promulgate
regulations that prohibit recipients of federal funds from taking any action that re-
suits in a disparate impact or produces discriminatory effects on the basis of race,
color or national origin. See id.; see also Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293. The central issue
presented in Sandoval is whether there is an implied private right of action for dispa-
rate impact cases based on regulations promulgated under section 602. Sandoval v.
Alexander, 197 F.3d 484, 502 (llth Cir. 2000).
8 Id. at 488 (citing ALA. CONST. amend. 509).
9 Id.
10 Id. at 487-88.
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censed and non-literate people, among others, to drive. 1
Martha Sandoval sued in federal court alleging, inter alia,
that the departmental policy discriminated against her and
others similarly situated on the basis of national origin in viola-
tion of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its imple-
menting regulations.12 More particularly, she alleged that the
department's policy and practice, in its effect, discriminated
against limited English reading immigrants. The district court
and United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
validated her Title VI discrimination claim.13 On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, Alabama did not contend that its
English-only testing was non-discriminatory. 14 Rather, it ar-
gued that Title VI does not create a private right of action
against states (or private businesses) for "disparate-impact"
violations-that is, all victims of discrimination, citizens and
non-citizens alike, should be denied access to courts to enforce
federal agency anti-discrimination regulations.15
On its facts, Sandoval is about the needs of newcomer
Americans to be free from national origin discrimination that
deprives them of the basic tools for social and economic sur-
vival.1 6 While specifically dealing with drivers' licensing, a
11 Id. at 488, 490. Although the Department's policy prohibited use of interpret-
ers, translation dictionaries, and other interpretive aids, it provided "special accom-
modations for illiterate, hearing-impaired, deaf, and disabled applicants." It also al-
lowed "[n]on-English-speaking drivers from other states and foreign countries to
exchange a valid out-of-state license for an Alabama license without taking the writ-
ten exam." Id. at 488.
12 Id. at 487. The regulations at issue provide that a funding recipient
may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangement, utilize cri-
teria or other methods of administration which have the effect of subject-
ing persons to discrimination because of their race, color or national ori-
gin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accom-
plishment of the objectives of the program with respect to individuals of
a particular race, color or national origin.
Id. at 502 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (Department of Transportation)); 28 C.F.R. §
42.104(b)(2) (Department of Justice).
13 The district court enjoined the Department from enforcing the English-only
policy and directed it to implement accommodation for Alabama's non-English-
speaking residents. Sandoval, 197 F.3d at 489. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the decision of the Eleventh Circuit on September 26,
2000. Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 28 (September 26, 2000) (mem.).
14 Petitioner's Brief, 1999 U.S. Briefs 1908 at *20, Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S.
Ct. 28 (November 13, 2000).
15 Id.
16 Respondent's Brief at *3 n.2, Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 28 (2000) ("the
denial of driver's licenses to such immigrants actually 'retards the learning of English'
and 'jeopardizes the assimilation of limited and non-English speaking persons into
the community' by tending to cut them off from 'normal interactions with English
speakers in the community at large."') (Sandoval v. Alexander, 7 F. Supp.2d 1234
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"no-individual-right-of-action" ruling will also extend to all
manner of newcomer discrimination by states and private enti-
ties receiving federal funds.
Sandoval is also significant because of its sweeping reach. It
raises the crucial question of who, in practice, will sue to end
illegal discrimination by many entities receiving federal
money. If harmed individuals are barred from the courthouse,
and enforcement of federal agency non-discrimination man-
dates is left to overburdened or uninterested agencies under
Attorney General Ashcroft's command, then exceedingly few
worthy disparate impact challenges will be initiated.17 Vindica-
tion of civil rights, including newly emerging environmental
racism/justice claims under Title VI, 18 will lag as states and
private entities face sharply diminished prospects of legal sanc-
tions for violating federal agency anti-discrimination rules.
Finally, placed in legal historical context, Sandoval is signifi-
cant because it signals another pivotal retreat from America's
commitment to civil rights for all, and particularly for those
suffering most from historic forms of discrimination.1 9 Piece by
piece, a divided Supreme Court has dismantled civil rights. As
developed below, the Court has been doing so under the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments by banning claims of institu-
tional discrimination, invalidating affirmative action programs,
limiting federal court powers to monitor school desegregation,
rejecting proof of racially discriminatory impact in death-
penalty sentencing, countermanding state voter redistricting
designed to ensure that votes of minorities count, invalidating
disability rights legislation, and striking down state constitu-
(M.D. Ala. 1998)); see also Sandoval, 197 F.3d at 489-90 ("thousands of Alabama resi-
dents of foreign descent suffer adversely from the Department's English-only policy
... not having a license often affected the ability of these adults to obtain employ-
ment, child care services, and other life essentials.") (quoting Sandoval, 7 F. Supp. 2d
1234).
17 Id. at *29-30 (highlighting the enforcement difficulties in compelling agencies
to investigate claims and discontinue funding).
1 See Julia B. Latham Worsham, Disparate hnpact Lawsuits Under Title V1, Section
602: Can a Legal Tool Build Environmental Justice?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 631
(2000) (arguing for use of Title VI, Section 602 as basis for environmental ra-
cism/justice claims that combine traditional environment law with civil rights); see
also Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environnmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787 (1993) (discussing racial and economic
inequities in the distribution of the benefits and burdens of environmental protection
and proposing Title VI civil rights claims as a possible basis for redress); Eric K. Ya-
mamoto and Jen-L Wong, Racializing Environmental Justice, U. COLO. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2001).
19 See infra Section I.A and B (discussing First and Second Reconstruction).
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tional provisions that provide Native Hawaiian elections as a
measure of self-determination. 20
The Court also has been dismantling civil rights through the
Eleventh Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the movable
mantle of "states' rights," deferring to states when they cut
back on civil rights and overruling states when they expand
civil rights protections. For instance, it has narrowly redefined
the reach of the Constitution's Commerce Clause to block a
Congressional act civilly advancing women's rights to be free
from violence and to invalidate key parts of age discrimination
legislation.21 The Court has also been narrowly interpreting the
employment discrimination remedies of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.22 And now the Court is poised, through Sandoval, to
allow any state to take a step back in the direction of Jim Crow
America. Indeed, a Court ruling invalidating private rights of
action to enforce federal agency disparate impact regulations
will accelerate the law's movement toward increasing legal ac-
ceptance of discrimination against America's communities of
color.
How is this systematic, multifaceted attack on civil rights
being achieved? How is it harming the long-term social health
of American society?
As developed in detail below, the United States promised
real equality to African Americans following the Civil War in a
period called the First Reconstruction. Newly freed African
Americans began to make real political and economic gains.
The federal government, however, quickly revoked that prom-
ise. The civil rights laws adopted as the foundation of the Re-
construction were torn apart by court rulings, massive political
resistance, and a lack of public will. Segregation and other
forms of discrimination, backed by threat of violence, took root
in law and social practice.23
In the 1960s, the United States acknowledged its failed first
promise of Reconstruction. After sustained African American
protests against segregation, once again, the nation committed
itself to equality and justice through both new laws and re-
invigorated older ones (including the Fourteenth Amendment
2 See infra Section I.C.1 (discussing the dismantling of the Second Reconstruc-
tion).
21 See infra Section I.C.2 (discussing indirect challenges to federal authority over
states).
2 See infra Section I.C.l.b (discussing attacks on Title VII).
23 See infra Section I.A. (discussing the demise of the First Reconstruction).
[Vol. 31:523
SYMPOSIUM - YAMAMOTO
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983) that, for a time, the courts vigorously en-
forced. The new laws included Title VII (employment), Title VI
(federal contractors), Title II (public accommodations) and Title
IX (gender) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights
Act, and the 1968 Fair Housing Act. These new laws also sup-
ported affirmative action in order to begin to level a grossly
unequal playing field. A Second Reconstruction, and real pro-
gress for African Americans, began to take hold.24
But then, as before, came a cultural and political backlash
against the gains by minorities, women, and immigrants, fol-
lowed by the tide of court decisions dismantling civil rights.
The civil rights retreat is now pushing the United States back
toward a more divided society. Some call it the "re-
segregating" of America. Sandoval emerges in this setting.
To more fully illuminate the significance of Sandoval and the
importance of collective multiracial responses to the attacks on
civil rights, we locate the case in the context of America's his-
toric civil rights struggle over racial equality. We also connect
the legal dismantling of the post-Civil War First Reconstruction
with the on-going conservative attacks on civil rights during
the contemporary Second Reconstruction.
I. BREAKING AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS PROMISES: THE FIRST
AND SECOND RECONSTRUCTIONS
America's First Broken Civil Rights Promise was its legal
dismantling of the First Reconstruction following the Civil
War.25 The First Reconstruction, with its congressional civil
24 See infra note 87, and accompanying text.
The history of the relationship between the federal and state governments and
Native Americans and their tribes is also marked by broken promises. Indeed, one
government official declared in 1869 that "It]he history of the government connections
with the Indians is a shameful record of broken treaties and unfulfilled promises."
Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
INDIAN POLICY 131 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 2d ed. 1990) (1869); see also, ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT (1990) (document-
ing the pattern of broken treaties and promises in the relationship betw~een western
European nations and the United States with Native Americans); Siegfried Wiessner,
American Indian Treaties and Modern International Law, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 567 (1995)
(discussing America's history of breaking treaties and promises to Native Americans);
Charles F. Wilkinson and John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation:
"As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth" - How Long a Time Is That?, 63
CAL. L. REV. 601 (1975) (discussing Congress'power to unilaterally abrogate treaties
made with Indian tribes and noting that legal recognition of abrogation results in the
destruction of treaty rights); Robert Yazzie, "Hozho Nahasdlii" - We Are Now In Good
Relations: Navajo Restorative Justice, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 117 (1996) (discussing Con-
gress' failure to "keep its promises to combat modern social problems in Indian coun-
2001]
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rights laws and constitutional amendments, uplifted freed
slaves, but only for a brief moment. That Reconstruction was
dismantled by a combination of factors: by popular White
backlash, by lack of presidential and congressional will (for
example, the 1872 Hayes-Tilden presidential compromise in
which the Republicans agreed to withdraw federal troops from
the South),26 and by the imprimatur of Supreme Court deci-
sions. Ruling by ruling, the Court gutted explicit civil rights
protections for Blacks. The Court's methodology first defined
civil rights laws in the narrowest possible fashion. It then re-
fused to recognize other civil rights at all. Finally, when it did
acknowledge African American rights, such as the right to
vote, and found those rights violated by states, it declined to
enforce them. Perhaps most significant, the Court signaled that
it would abdicate authority over civil rights to the states, which
created disastrous results. 27
The Court, in concert with intractable White resistance, 28
ushered in state law regimes of de jure Jim Crow segregation
and contributed to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and unchecked
racial violence. The result: post- Civil War Reconstruction laws
on the books but without enforcement, and continuing sys-
temic subordination of African Americans. This meant exclu-
sion from schools, workplaces, housing, social services, and
politics, as well as the badge of racial inferiority. For African
Americans, there was no steady post-Civil War upward pull
toward equality. 29 Indeed, the briefest bright moment of Re-
construction gave way to eighty years of social, economic, and
political darkness - America's First Broken Civil Rights Prom-
ise.
African Americans continued their struggle for equality and
justice in the face of state-sanctioned White terrorism and seg-
try"). For general histories of America's relationship with Native Americans, see gen-
erally DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1970); ANGIE DEBO, A
HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES (1970); VINE DELORIA, JR., AMERICAN
INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1985). For an overview of America's rela-
tionship with Native Hawaiians, see generally KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 1; HAUNANI-
KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAI'I
(1993); LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, HAWAII PONO: AN ETHNIC AND POLITICAL HISTORY
(1961).
26 See generally DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 54 (4th ed.
2000).
27 See infra Section I.A.
2 See infra notes 50-53, and accompanying text.
2 BELL, supra note 26, at 58.
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regation.30 These struggles set the stage for the Civil Rights
Movement and the Second Reconstruction. After organized and
sustained protests and brutal government repression, which
were carried into middle America by television, the United
States renewed its commitment to civil rights and offered a
hard-earned promise to African Americans and all subordi-
nated Americans: real equality and justice -America's second
Civil Rights Promise. This time, through the Second Recon-
struction, America would do it right. Indeed, the Bull Connor
fire hoses and attack dogs are gone, as are the "Whites only"
signs in restaurants. Additionally, with the boost from the early
stages of civil rights enforcement and affirmative action, a
small Black middle class emerged and America's immigration
laws opened doors to a more ethnically and culturally diverse
populace.31
But large racial disparities persist. Comprehensive studies
show continuing institutional discrimination against African
Americans and other non-White ra ial groups.32 The United
States has never actually leveled the steeply tilted racial play-
ing field. Yet, as discussed below, America, again, through its
courts, is revoking its commitment to the Second Reconstruc-
tion. And, as in its divisive past, it is doing so through piece by
piece legal acceptance of discrimination.
Over the past twenty years, the progress of the Second Re-
construction and the substantial steps toward justice and equal-
ity have been reversed by increasing legal acceptance of ine-
quality in America. 33 "Civil rights retrenchment" has been
marked by successful direct challenges to federal civil rights
legislation and constitutional protections, and by indirect chal-
lenges to federal authority over the states-the old states'
rights argument dressed in new clothes. 34
30 While organized racism in the early twentieth century took on a new nativist
cast, it retained its old-style precepts of White supremacy:
[Tihe new Invisible Empire expanded its sights beyond the old goal of
keeping African Americans down... [however,] the new KKK's activities
in this regard were exemplary-Klansmen paraded through southern
towns on the eve of the 1920 election to terrorize black people out of vot-
ing, intimidated black workers and pressured white employers to fire or
demote them, and forced black people out of a part of South Jacksonville
that white people wanted for themselves alone, to name a few exam-
ples[.]
See Harris, supra note 5, at 1974-75.
31 See infra notes 86-97, and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 88-95, and accompanying text.
33 See infra Section II.C.
34 See Kimberls Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transforma-
2001]
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Sandoval's likely elimination of a private right of action to
enforce agency disparate impact regulations under section 602
of Title VI should be seen in this context-at the precipice of
America's Second Broken Civil Rights Promise. The next sec-
tion describes the specifics of civil rights retrenchment- the
legal dismantling of the First and now the Second Reconstruc-
tions.
A. The Demise of the First Reconstruction
In the wake of the Civil War, the First Reconstruction pro-
vided a foundation for universal civil and political freedom
throughout the United States.35 The Civil Rights Acts and the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution were the centerpieces of a Recon-
struction whose clear legislative and popular purpose was to
uplift Blacks from two hundred years of systemic subordina-
tion in America.36 The Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery. 37
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were designed to
end doubt about the constitutionality and purpose of civil
rights laws. 38 A series of Civil Rights Acts protected Black civil
rights against state and private interference.39 In short, the evil
tion and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) (describ-
ing the Reagan administration's hostility toward civil rights enforcement); see also
infra Section II.C.
See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOL-
UTION 1863-77 (1st ed. 1989).
3 See Harris, supra note 5, at 1930-37 (describing the legal structure and subse-
quent dismantling of the First Reconstruction as historical context for the thesis that a
constant tension in American race law has been the effort to reconcile constitutional
and statutory norms of equality with the desire for White dominance).
37 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, ex-
cept as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."). Section 2
gave Congress the power to enforce this article through appropriate legislation. Id.
38 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (nationalizing citizenship and prohibiting the
states from abridging the privileges and immunities of any United States citizen or
depriving any citizen of due process or equal protection under the law); U.S. CONST.
amend. XV (guaranteeing the right to vote to all men regardless of race or color); see
also Harris, supra note 5, at 1931-32.
39 See id. at 1932 (discussing a series of civil rights acts including, inter alia, the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 (providing that all persons born in the U.S. were citizens,
regardless of color, with the same rights as White citizens); the Civil Rights Act of
1870 (including all persons, rather than just citizens, within the jurisdiction of the U.S.
and rendering illegal certain types of discrimination against Chinese); the Klu Klux
Klan Act of 1871 (criminalizing conspiracy to deprive any person of equal protection);
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (requiring various places of public accommodation to,
inter alia, open their accommodations to "all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States" subject to "conditions applicable alike to citizens of every race and
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addressed by these enactments was White supremacy.
For a brief period, the First Reconstruction contributed to
relatively substantial gains in the African American commu-
nity: school enrollment (two percent in 1860 vs. thirty-four per-
cent in 1880); literacy rates (ten percent in 1860 vs. thirty per-
cent in 1880); land ownership (zero in 1865 vs. twenty percent
in 1880); and political participation (zero Black public officials
in 1867 vs. at least fifteen percent of all Southern officeholders
by 1870-and less than three percent in 1979).40 However, the
promises provided by these civil rights laws and constitutional
amendments were soon undermined by a combination of fac-
tors. Each branch of government-judicial, legislative, and ex-
ecutive -participated in dismantling the First Reconstruction.
The resulting legal acceptance of harsh discrimination rein-
forced ongoing, widespread violence against Blacks and other
minorities in the United States. 41
Judicial retrenchment began almost immediately with the
sharp narrowing of the privileges and immunities protections
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Going well beyond the Consti-
tution's text in The Slaughterhouse Cases,42 the Court first distin-
guished the rights of state citizenship from those of national
citizenship. It then held that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause protected only a limited range of "national rights" such
as the right to travel, and otherwise left states free to discrimi-
nate.43
The Court next invalidated the significant public accommo-
dation provisions of the 1875 Civil Rights Act by narrowing the
scope of civil rights law to exclude "social rights." 44 The major-
ity in the Civil Rights Cases concluded that "[miere discrimina-
tions on account of race or color" in restaurants, hotels and
theaters involve private social rights, not state action, and
color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude")).
40 BELL, supra note 26, at 43-44 & nn.13-16.
41 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 5, at 1968-69 (discussing the "quasi-legal" status of
lynchings during the Jim Crow era) and at 1943-44 (discussing the Chinese Exclusion
Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892)).
42 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
43 Id. at 77-78; see also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (dismissing
indictments in the 1873 Colfax massacre, in which several hundred armed Whites
burned a courthouse and killed more than one hundred Black men holding a public
assembly in a courthouse over a disputed gubernatorial election on the grounds that
the rights violated were not those protected by the Constitution or any law of Con-
gress); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) (invalidating provisions of the En-
forcement Act of 1870 used to indict a Kentucky registrar who refused to count an
African American's vote).
44 Civil Rigits Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
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therefore are not prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.45
The Court therefore declared the Civil Rights Act of 1875 un-
constitutional. 46 The law accepted "social" segregation, even in
public accommodation. As a result, many states not only prac-
ticed discrimination, they enacted it into law. These laws cou-
pled with the withdrawal of federal troops from the South as
part of a compromise resolution of the contested 1876 presiden-
tial election devastated civil rights for African Americans.47
Federal criminal enforcement of civil rights, for instance, dra-
matically decreased from 1,304 prosecutions in 1873 to twenty-
five in 1878.48
The infamous "separate but equal" doctrine followed. That
doctrine undermined the equal protection rights of Blacks. In
Plessy v. Ferguson49 the Court observed that the Fourteenth
Amendment "could not have been intended to abolish distinc-
tions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished
from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon
terms unsatisfactory to either." 50
White supremacy campaigns that began shortly after the
civil war were fueled by an environment of suspicion and fear
bred by this legally-sanctioned separation of races. 51 Thou-
sands of lynchings of African Americans took place, often un-
der the watchful eye of government law officials. Indeed, one
prosecutor dismissed the lynchings as "an expression of the
45 Id. (also finding inapplicable the Thirteenth Amendment's ban on slavery).
46 Id.; see also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882) (striking down the Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871 on the grounds that protection of individuals from private
conspiracies is a state not a federal function).
47 BELL, supra note 26, at 51-53 (describing the Hayes-Tilden compromise).
48 Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights--Will
the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 11 (1985).
49 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding state statute barring persons from occupying
passenger train cars other than those to which their race had been assigned), rev'd, 347
U.S. 483 (1954); see also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1709,
1745 -1750 (1993) (analyzing Plessy in terms of a property interest in Whiteness).
50 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544; see also Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ.,
175 U.S. 528 (1899) (refusing to reinstate injunction prohibiting state board from col-
lecting school tax levies for the maintenance of a high school system that solely bene-
fited Whites until equal facilities were provided for African American students); Berea
Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (upholding statute subjecting a private college to
a heavy fine for admitting both White and Black students). In a prescient dissent to
Berea College, Justice Harlan observed that if a state could limit the association of
White and Black persons in private schools, it could also bar minority religious and
nationality groups not only from schools but from churches, the marketplace and
other public places. Id. at 69.
-1 See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 804-05 (1966) (discussing the rise of
White supremacy groups, such as the Klu Klux Klan).
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will of the people." 2 Parallel attacks on immigrants and other
minorities also took place during this period. As the United
States Commission on Civil Rights recognized, "Asian Ameri-
cans share with American Blacks the distinction of having been
the targets of widespread legal discrimination that hindered
their ability to participate fully in the American dream." 53
Both Congress and state legislatures also played a signifi-
cant part in dismantling the First Reconstruction. The period
from 1890 to 1910 witnessed a steady rise of state Jim Crow
statutes in both the North and South. 4 Efforts to prevent social
contact between the supposedly superior and inferior races ap-
plied to both public and private facilities. Discriminatory state
laws called for segregation in virtually all aspects of society.55
In 1894, Congress repealed thirty-nine sections of the civil
rights voting laws.56 Even where civil rights laws remained,
and where states clearly violated those laws to prevent African
Americans from voting, the Court refused to order injunctive
relief on grounds of the political volatility of the issue.5 7
The executive branch joined the judicial and the legislative
branches in effectively dismantling the First Reconstruction.
The Department of Justice, for example, proudly asserted that
it had adopted a policy of "strict self-limitation with regard to
52 BELL, supra note 26, at 461 n.1 (quoting M. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND
SOUTHERN ORDER 8-9 (1987)); see also Harris, supra note 5, at 1966-69 (describing how
the "blurriness" of the line between legal and social spheres after Plessy permitted
government complicity in the face of horrific violence against African Americans, and
suggesting that racial violence actually attained quasi-legal status through govern-
ment acquiescence and inaction); Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the
Intersection of Race and Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31 (1996);
Harris, supra note 5, at 1966-69 (describing how "private" acts of terror against Afri-
can Americans often had the force of law).
'3 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES FACING ASIAN
AMERICANS IN THE 1990S 6-7 (1992); see also Harris, supra note 5, at 1969 (proposing
that racial violence against Chinese and other non-White Americans had the purpose
or effect of expressing that the victims were not entitled to equal status in the social
realm).
4 See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d ed.
1974).
55 John Hope Franklin, History of Racial Segregation in the United States, in
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 341 (Mar. 1956)
-1 BLACKMUN, supra note 48, at 11.
57 See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (denying request for injunctive relief
against state constitutional provision); see also Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146 (1904);
James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1923) (denying federal authority to prosecute indi-
vidual who prevented Kentucky Blacks from voting in a congressional election
through an act of bribery); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) ("grandfather
clauses" do not violate constitutional rights); Breedlove v. Shuttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937)
(poll taxes do not violate constitutional rights).
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prosecutions under the civil rights acts." 5 8 Furthermore,
"[u]ntil 1949, [Federal Housing Administration] official policy
was to refuse to insure any unsegregated housing. It was not
until . . . 1962 that the Agency required nondiscrimination
pledges from loan applicants."5 9
Although the Civil Rights Acts and constitutional amend-
ments remained, their promise had been eviscerated by the
"social rights" exclusion from antidiscrimination law and by
ensuing states' Jim Crow laws covering voting, public accom-
modations, jobs, transportation, education, and housing. All
three branches of government participated in the piece by piece
dismantling of on-the-books civil rights protections for Blacks.
The demise of the First Reconstruction paved the way for a
fully segregated American society, one that was separate and
starkly unequal-a society at profound dissonance with the
nation's professed moral creed that "all are created equal."
B. The Second (Contemporary) Reconstruction
The Second Reconstruction offered a renewed commitment
to civil rights for African Americans and other subordinated
communities of color. Substantial African American contribu-
tions to the war effortA6 the massive social, legal, and political
movement launched by antiracist activists, and the legal re-
forms of the 1950s and 1960s -highlighted by Brown v. Board of
Education,61 and culminating in the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965-laid the
foundation for the Second Reconstruction. 62 Together with the
8 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 159 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
59 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 260
(1968).
60 See Harris, supra note 5, at 1987-881
The end of the war sparked a new activism in groups considered non-
white. Returning African American and Mexican American troops found
Jim Crow impossible to stomach after having served their country with
honor and distinction, and often after having been treated as equals by
white Europeans. In the post-war period, anti-racist activists, working
both through local, grass roots groups and national organizations like the
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and the National As-
sociation for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) began to
campaign vigorously to end American apartheid.
Id.
61 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
(1975).
62 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §1447, 42 U.S.C. §§
1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h6 (1994)); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437 (codi-
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resurrection of the Civil Rights Act of 187063 and the advent of
affirmative action, these legal reforms collectively renewed the
nation's commitment to civil rights and, even more important,
to equality and justice. 64
Brown in 1954 breathed new life into the Equal Protection
Clause in the face of pervasive segregation and continuing ra-
cial violence.65 In outlawing state-mandated segregation, Brown
offered the promise of equal treatment for African Americans
and compelled national acknowledgment of entrenched forms
of racial discrimination. In the years following Brown, the Su-
preme Court nullified Jim Crow policies in streetcars, buses,
cafeterias, golf courses, swimming pools, and courtrooms. 66
In the decade that followed, with the support of progressive
Whites and other communities of color, Blacks struggled to
achieve equality despite massive resistance by Southern
Whites. 67 In response to post-Brown resistance, continuing dis-
fled at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (1994)); see MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM AND
REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCrION IN AMERICA, 1945-1990 (1991) ("The Second
Reconstruction was a series of massive confrontations concerning the status of Afri-
can-American and other national minorities (e.g., Indians, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans,
Asians) in the nation's economic, social and political institutions.").
6 See Harris, supra note 5, at 1993-94 (discussing the Warren Court's "resusci-
tat[ion" of the First Reconstruction civil rights statutes, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1982, 1983).
" See generally id. at 1989-96. Harris aptly describes the range of social and po-
litical forces underlying the Second Reconstruction:
Between the late 1940s and the late 1960s, antiracist activists-most nota-
bly those in the African American civil rights and "Black Power" move-
ments-successfully cultivated the seeds of antidiscrimination law found
in cases like Carolene Products and even in Plessy itself. Their legal and
political efforts, combined with a massive grass roots social movement of
a scale and moral power not seen since abolitionism, and coupled with
the new political and social vulnerability of racial segregation and dis-
crimination, eventually forced the United States into a political crisis. The
outcome of that crisis was the so-called Second Reconstruction: a move-
ment within both Congress and the Supreme Court to uproot de jure ra-
cial segregation, to create new legal tools to fight discrimination, and to
breathe new life into the long-forgotten remnants of the First Reconstruc-
tion.
Id. at 1989. Professor Harris posits that "the Second Reconstruction consisted of three
elements: civil rights law from the First Reconstruction, new legislation from Con-
gress, and a withdrawal from various doctrines of plenary power." Id.
( BELL, supra note 26, at 170. A year later, however, the Court issued a separate
ruling in Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), directing the enforcement of Brown I's desegre-
gation decree with "all deliberate speed," essentially permitting Southern Whites to
resist the requirements of Brown 1. Id. at 167-170.
66 Id. at 278; see also Harris, supra note 5, at 1991 (describing how the Court dur-
ing this period also outlawed racially restrictive covenants, restricted the states' abil-
ity to persecute civil rights organizations and demonstrators, held unconstitutional
anti-Asian land laws, and prohibited antimiscegenation statutes).
67 See generally BELL, supra note 26, at 166-70.
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crimination, and virulent White supremacy, the Civil Rights
Movement pushed Congress to pass the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act
of 1968. 68 Cumulatively, the 1964 Civil Rights Act expressly
outlawed racial, national origin, religion, and gender discrimi-
nation in public facilities, employment, education, and other
federally funded activities.69 The legislation- directed primar-
ily at removing the barriers to equal opportunity for African
Americans -solidified America's commitment to federal pro-
tection for these targets of discrimination. 70 The legislation was
not meant to be colorblind; it took express account of the social
and political significance of race. 71 In particular, Title VI of the
Act, as construed in Guardians Association v. Civil Service Com-
missionn of New York City,72 authorized federal agencies to
promulgate appropriate regulations to combat "disparate im-
pact" discrimination-that is, discrimination against groups
regardless of the "intent" of the discriminator. Title VI, section
602, now challenged in Sandoval, was an integral part of the
civil rights laws comprising the Second Reconstruction.
Court rulings following the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 confirmed the validity of "disparate impact" chal-
lenges to discriminatory practices. In the landmark case of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,73 the United States Supreme Court
6 During this time period, Congress also passed the Immigration and National-
ity Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (abolishing restrictions on im-
migration based on race, religion and nationality).
6 The separate Titles of the 1964 Civil Rights Act protect different groups. For
instance, with respect to federally funded entities, Title VI proscribes discrimination
based on race, color, and national origin, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., and Title IX
addresses gender discrimination, see 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. With respect to employ-
ment, Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
70 As Professor Harris observes,
In addition to creating private rights of action to enforce the Act, Con-
gress created a new federal agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), and gave it the power to investigate complaints and
issue regulations under the Act. Several years later the EEOC received
the power to institute civil actions on its own.
Harris, supra note 5, at 1994.
71 In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress expressly recognized that the
"most glaring" discrimination against any minority group in America was against
"Negroes," who, "100 years after their formal emancipation," were "not accorded the
rights, privileges, and opportunities which are considered to be, and must be the
birthright of all citizens." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., (2d Sess. 1964), reprinted in
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2393. Congress clearly intended the federal legislation to secure
those rights, state and local progress having been deemed "too slow." Id.
n 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
7 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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first made clear that Title VII prohibits facially neutral em-
ployment practices in disparate impact cases if those practices
operate to maintain the status quo of prior discrimination.
Twelve years later in Guardians, the Court determined that the
administrative regulations implementing Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act were valid and, accordingly, Title VI reached unin-
tentional, disparate-impact discrimination as well as deliberate
racial discrimination. 74
In addition, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 opened up the
polls to all African Americans for the first time since the end of
the First Reconstruction. 75 Its elaborate measures created "an
affirmative right to vote, instead of just a negative right to be
free of discrimination in voting." 76 The enactment of the Civil
Rights and Voting Rights Acts thus reinforced the guarantees
of the Reconstruction amendments and signaled the fall of Jim
Crow.
Initial reactive legal challenges to the Second Reconstruction
failed. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of both the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts.
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,77 the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of Title II (addressing public
accommodations) as a proper exercise of Congress' authority
under the Commerce Clause. In the same year, in Katzenbach v.
McClung,78 the Court again confirmed the constitutional valid-
ity of Title II. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,79 the Court
soundly rejected a constitutional challenge to the Voting Rights
Act and held that the Act "reflects Congress' firm intention to
rid the country of racial discrimination in voting." Finally, in
74 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 589-93. At around the same period, Congress passed the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965),
which abolished restrictions on immigration based on race, religion and nationality,
and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (prohibiting discrimination on grounds of race,
color, religion or national origin in the sale or rental of housing).
7 See Harris, supra note 5, at 1994 (observing that the Act "had an immediate
and dramatic effect on minority voting and political participation, bringing thousands
of citizens into electoral politics for the first time.")
76 Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimnination Law: The View from 1989, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW 121, 130 (D. Kairys, ed. 1990); see also Drew S. Days, III & Lani Guinier, Enforce-
went of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 167, 167-68
(Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (observing that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 was particularly important because its goal was to "shift the advantage of time
and inertia" from wrongdoers to the victims of discrimination); Harris, sipra note 5, at
1994.
-' 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
79 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
79 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966).
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Katzenbach v. Morgan,80 the Court upheld Section 4(e) of the
Voting Rights Act as a valid exercise of Congress' powers un-
der Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the same time, the Court gave new life to First Recon-
struction civil rights statutes. 81 In Monroe v. Pape,82 the Court
held that victims of police brutality could state a claim against
police officers and city officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (an
original First Reconstruction civil rights law) because such bru-
tality was carried out "under color of" state law within the
meaning of the statute. Then, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,83
the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 bars both private and pub-
lic racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property and
confirmed that the statute was a valid exercise of Congress'
powers under the Thirteenth Amendment.84 Collectively, the
Court's rulings during this period provided judicial legitimacy
to congressional and executive actions protecting the civil
rights of racial minorities and reinforced the legal foundation
of the Second Reconstruction. 85
Over time, the antidiscrimination laws, executive actions,
and court decrees of the Second Reconstruction compelled gov-
ernmental prohibition of racial discrimination, established af-
firmative action, and generated expanded opportunities and
structural improvements for African Americans and other
communities of color in America. 86
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
51 Harris, supra note 5, at 1989-90.
82 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978).
83 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
84 The Supreme Court later extended § 1981 protections to private contracts. See
Harris, supra note 5, at 1992 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
5 The executive branch also recommitted itself to providing real equality and
justice to African Americans and other subordinated Americans. In 1961, for example,
President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10925, which compelled contractors with
the federal government to do more than ensure "equal opportunity"-it required
them "to take 'affirmative action' to ensure that discrimination did not occur." Harris,
supra note 5, at 1995. Later, in 1968, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance enacted
a new code requiring contractors and large subcontractors to develop "affirmative
action plans." Id. As Professor Harris observes, "[tihe creation and operation of af-
firmative action programs, both voluntary and mandatory, contributed to a surge of
people of color into areas of employment and higher education from which they had
previously been excluded." id.
8 See Harris, supra note 5, at 1989-96.
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C. Dismantling the Second Reconstruction: The Re-Legalization of
Discrimination
The legal reforms and social movements that comprised the
Second Reconstruction resulted in significant changes for Afri-
can Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, women, and immi-
grants. These changes included expanded job opportunities,
increased access to education, a decrease in state sponsored
racial violence, immigration reform that offered citizenship to
many non-Whites, and a moratorium on the application of the
death penalty. 87
But the victories were short lived. African Americans and
the country never realized the full promise of these reforms. As
with the First Reconstruction, since the mid-1970s, conservative
groups have successfully waged systematic legal attacks in the
courts and legislatures, along with a cultural and political cru-
sade through ballot initiatives and the mainstream media.88
These attacks, both direct and indirect, have had real conse-
quences. For example, the incarceration rate for African Ameri-
can males is over four times higher than that of Whites. 89 Racial
87 See, e.g., Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action as Equalizing
Opportunity: Challenging the Myth of "Preferential Treatment," 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 127,
131-32 (1999-2000) (reporting that "the proportion of employed Blacks who hold mid-
die class jobs rose from 13.4 percent in 1960 to 37.8 percent in 1981 ... [and that] [t]he
number of Black college students rose from 340,000 in 1966 to more than one million
in 1982") (citing ROBERT BLAUNER, BLACK LIVES, WHITE LIVES: THREE DECADES OF
RACE RELATIONS IN AMERICA (1989); Harris, supra note 5, at 1991-92 (observing that
"Itihe fall of Jim Crow was accompanied by new constitutional restrictions on the
power of the police to maintain racial order .... These restrictions on police discre-
tion made it increasingly difficult for the police to act as the enforcement arm of white
supremacy"); Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and imnigration: Challenges for the Latino
Community in the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 80-81 (1995) (discussing the
impact of the 1965 repeal of national origin quotas in U.S. immigration law on the
racial and ethnic communities of the U.S.) (citing inter alia, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1992
Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 27-28 (1993)); U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Introduction, The Federal Death Penalty System: A Statistical Survey
(1988-2000) (stating that "Itihe Supreme Court issued a ruling in 1972 that had the
effect of invalidating capital punishment throughout the United States-both in the
federal criminal justice system and in all the states that then provided for the death
penalty") (referring to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)); Harris, supra note 5, at
1991-92 ("The fall of Jim Crow was accompanied by new constitutional restrictions on
the power of the police to maintain racial order .... These restrictions on police dis-
cretion made it increasingly difficult for the police to act as the enforcement arm of
white supremacy.").
8 See JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, NO MERCY: How CONSERVATIVE
THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL AGENDA 139-154 (1996).
89 United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1997 Study,
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/gcorpop.htm#CorrPopRace.
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minorities continue to face discrimination in employment, 9°
housing,91 and access to health care.92 White supremacist
groups and anti-immigrant sentiment 93 have grown. State-
sponsored English-only laws, bans on bilingual education, anti-
immigrant initiatives, and repeals of affirmative action pro-
grams impede racial minorities' full participation in American
society. 94 Many city public schools are segregated along racial
90 "Despite many federal efforts to provide equal employment opportunities re-
gardless of race, such as Civil Rights Act of 1991, economic outcomes for African
Americans persistently lag behind those of whites in the United States." General Ac-
counting Office, Equal Employment Opportunity: Displacement Rates, Unemployment
Spells, and Reemployment Wages by Race, Fact Sheet, 9/16/94, GAO/HEHS-94-229FS.
Average African American wage rates and unemployment rates are consistently be-
low those of Whites. Id. Even in times of economic growth, African Americans experi-
enced the worst labor market outcomes regardless of the state of the economy. Mi-
norities also suffer higher displacement rates when cutbacks are implemented. Id.; see
also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (dis-
cussing the failure of current employment discrimination law to address contempo-
rary forms of discrimination).
9 For example, researchers in Boston found that Black and Hispanic applicants
were over fifty percent more likely to be denied a mortgage loan than Whites, even
after taking into account many factors relevant to the credit-granting decision. An-
thony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment: Structural
Economic theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1463, 1474-76) (1994). A report "by the Federal Reserve Board in 1991 revealed a wide
gap between the mortgage denial rates for whites and those for other minorities." See
BELL, supra note 26, at 315. "Among the highest income applicant group, the denial
rate nationally for blacks was 21.4%; for whites 8.5%; for Asians 11.2%." Id. at n.7; see
also John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewing a Stone of
Hope from a Mountain of Despair," 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233 (1995) (identifying the rela-
tionship between residential segregation and formation of racial identity).
9 While the disparity in access between Whites and non-Whites can be partially
explained in economic terms, racism is an independent factor resulting in dispropor-
tionate obstacles for people of color. This is illustrated by the fact that minorities
whose source of payment is the same as that of Whites still receive less care. For in-
stance, on a national level, African Americans receive one-half (in Southern states,
one-third) as many coronary artery bypass operations as White patients with similar
symptoms and source of payment. See RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET. AL., LAW AND THE
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 108-109 (1997) (quoted in Larry J. Pittman, Physician
Assisted Suicide in the Dark Ward: The Intersection of the Thirteenth Amendment and Health
Care Treatments Having Disproportionate Inpacts, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 774, 820 n.195
(1998)). See generally Sylvia A. Law, A Right To Health Care That Cannot Be Taken Away:
The Lessons Of Twenty-Five Years Of Health Care Advocacy, 61 TENN. L. REV. 771, 789-92
(1994).
93 See Nancy Cervantes, Sasha Khokha & Bobbie Murray, Hate Unleashed: Los An-
geles In The Aftermath of Proposition 187, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1 (1995); see also
IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE
UNITED STATES (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the hnimnigration Laws,
and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror" Into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J.
1111 (1998); BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH
IMMIGRATION POLICY 1850-1990 (1993).
9 Twenty-six states have enacted English-only laws. See Christian A. Garza,
Measuring Language Rights along a Spectrum, 110 YALE L.J. 379, 386 n.2 (2000); Carey
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and ethnic lines, with marked differences in the quality of edu-
cation.95
The direct attacks have been aimed at the specifics of civil
rights legislation and anti-discrimination law doctrine.96 The
indirect challenges have attempted to drastically restrict the
federal government's role in enforcing civil rights. Ironically,
the renewed call for "states' rights" and the refrains of "reverse
discrimination," "racial preferences," and "colorblindness"
have partly refocused civil rights on protecting the interests of
White Americans. 97 Politically, the success of these legal chal-
lenges and the pervasiveness of this popular rhetoric reveal an
America close to again revoking its commitment to civil rights
for African Americans and other racial minorities.
1. Direct Challenges to Civil Rights
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965
and the landmark decisions that challenged over a century of
invidious discrimination against minorities are now subject to
direct challenge.
a. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
Grounded in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the
Second Reconstruction firmly established the federal govern-
ment's role in protecting civil rights for African Americans and
other minorities. 98 Since the mid-1970s, however, the Supreme
Goldberg, The 2000 Elections: Ballot Initiatives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000; see also Susan
Kiyomi Serrano, Rethinking Racefor Strict Scrutiny Purposes: Yniguez and the Racializa-
tion of English Only, 19 U. HAw. L. REV. 221 (1997); Juan F. Perea, Demography and
Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77
MINN. L. REV. 269 (1992); CALIFORNIA PROPOSITION 187 (restricting rights of immi-
grants) and CALIFORNIA PROPOSITION 209 (banning affirmative action programs).
95 BELL, supra note 26, at 214-15.
96 See Crenshaw, supra note 34; see also Yamamoto, infra note 109, at 850.
97 For example, California's Proposition 209, the anti-affirmative action initiative
which was fueled by claims of "reverse discrimination" against innocent Whites, was
called the "California Civil Rights Initiative." See Pete Wilson, Ward Connerly, Pam-
ela A. Lewis, Argument in Favor or Proposition 209, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET:
GENERAL ELECTION (1996) (arguing that affirmative action results in reverse discrimi-
nation).
98 See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 238-39 (1972) ("As a result of the new structure
of law that emerged in the post-Civil War era -and especially of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was its centerpiece -the role of the Federal Government as a
guarantor of basic federal rights against state power was clearly established.") (citing
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245-249 (1967));
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Court's equal protection jurisprudence has reflected an increas-
ing unwillingness to allow the government to carry out that
role. In particular, the Court has adopted a restrictive view of
discrimination that ignores many realities of contemporary ra-
cism.99 In Washington v. Davis,100 the Court significantly re-
stricted the scope of unconstitutional discrimination by impos-
ing a new "intent" requirement on plaintiffs alleging violations
of the Equal Protection Clause. Statutes or policies that are fa-
cially neutral can now be challenged only with proof of the ac-
tual discriminatory intent of the individual or institutional ac-
tors- proof which is difficult to muster since a person's intent
is often easily disguised. 10 1 The standard adopted in Washing-
ton markedly limited the reach of the Equal Protection Clause
by legally countenancing institutional and unconscious dis-
criminatory practices. 10 2
In McCleskey v. Kemp,103 for example, the Court denied a de-
fendant's equal protection claim despite overwhelming evi-
dence of racially discriminatory treatment of criminal defen-
dants subject to the death penalty in Georgia.10 4 The Court
placed a virtually impossible burden on the defendant by re-
quiring proof that the death penalty statute was enacted inten-
H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); J. TENBROEK, THE
ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951); see also Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489 (1999) (citing J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 201 (rev. ed. 1965).
9 See infra Section II.B.2 (discussing subconscious forms of discrimination).
1-0 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
101 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 246 (1995) ("A state actor
inclined to subvert the Constitution might easily hide bad intentions in the guise of
unintended 'effects' ...") (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Charles R. Lawrence, III.,
The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV.
317, 319 (1987) (discussing the failure of the intent doctrine to acknowledge uncon-
scious forms of discrimination); see infra Section II.B.
102 See infra Section II.B.2. In recent years, the Court has affirmed civil rights in a
limited number of cases. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding
that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors
solely on account of their race); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (invalidating
a Colorodo constitutional amendment prohibiting governmental efforts to protect
homosexuals from discrimination); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 269
(1999) (upholding challenge to county-wide election scheme based on alleged vote
dilution under Voting Rights Act of 1965); Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S.
Ct. 1043, 1046 (2001) (invalidating restriction on Legal Services Corporation that
would prevent grant recipients representing indigent clients from arguing that a state
statute violates federal law).
1- 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
104 Id. at 286-291 (citing evidence from Baldus, Pulaski & Woodsworth, Coinpara-
tive Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983)). See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and
Delay: The Moral Politics of Death Penalty Abolitionists, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325
(1996) (discussing contemporary attempts at death penalty reforms and abolition).
546 [Vol. 31:523
20011 SYMPOSIUM - YAMAMOTO 547
tionally to discriminate against African Americans.10 5 Racial
disparities in the application of the death penalty continue to
exist.106 Under the Court's intent standard, however, many
non-Whites on death row with plausible claims of racial dis-
crimination in sentencing are left without redress. 10 7 The Su-
preme Court's restrictive intent standard also has been em-
ployed to limit minority protections against discrimination in
other areas of the law.10 8
Yet, with unacknowledged irony, the Court has invoked the
Fourteenth Amendment and the idea of "colorblindness" in
favor of Whites to overturn governmental efforts to remedy the
effects of long-standing discrimination against non-Whites. In
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia,10 9 a reverse discrimination
case brought by White contractors, the Court held that all racial
classifications -including affirmative action programs de-
signed to remedy past discrimination-are subject to strict
105 The Court reasoned that, "[tihere was no evidence then, and there is none
now, that the Georgia Legislature enacted the capital punishment statute to further a
racially discriminatory purpose." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298.
10 For example, from 1988-1994, of the 52 defendants submitted by the US Attor-
neys' Office for the death penalty, 75% were Black, 10% Hispanic, and 13% White.
From 1995 to 2000, of the 682 submitted under current procedures, 48% Black, 29%
Hispanic, 20% White. U.S. Department of Justice, The Federal Death Penalty System:
A Statistical Survey (1988-2000). In addition, a 1998 study in Philadelphia revealed
that the odds of receiving the death penalty are four times greater for a Black defen-
dant than a White one. David C. Baldus, et al., Racial Discrinination and the Death
Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: Al Empirical and Legal Overview, With Recent Findings
FromnPhiladelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998).
i07 See generally Baldus, supra note 106. New legislation has also imposed strin-
gent limitations of federal habeas petitions in capital cases. See Special Habeus Corpus
Proceedings in Death Penalty Cases, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 107(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1221
(1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2261 (2000)). Despite the limited redress
available in federal courts, the application of the death penalty is coming under in-
creasing attack. For example, due to the striking number of "erroneous" death penalty
convictions (more post-appeal determination of innocence than executions), Illinois'
Republican governor halted all executions. See William Claiborne, Illinois Order on
Executions Lauded; Governor Backs Moratorium After 13 Death Row Inmates Are Exoner-
ated, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2000, at A2.
108 See, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) (rejecting asylum claim
where applicant offered evidence that guerillas threatened retaliation if he refused to
fight with them against the government, stating that evidence that persecutors were
politically motivated was insufficient evidence that the applicant feared persecution
,on account of" his political opinion); see also Krieger, supra note 90 (critiquing the
requirement in Title VII disparate treatment cases that plaintiffs show discriminatory
motive or intent).
1- 515 U.S. 200 (1995); see also Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory
and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 M[CH. L. REV. 821 (1997)
(describing how the Court in Adarand used "colorblindness" ideologically to obscure
the difference between race-conscious programs that support systemic subordinating
and those endeavoring to dismantle it).
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scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and are, therefore,
presumptively invalid. In City of Richmond v. Croson,110 the
Court determined that the City's detailed findings of its own
past discrimination and the nation's widespread discrimination
in the contracting industry were insufficient to justify local
government race-based affirmative action.
In an apparent abandonment of its earlier support for reme-
dial voting rights legislation, the Court also recently over-
turned several state redistricting plans designed to remedy un-
equal voting representation 1 ' -- a key component of the Sec-
ond Reconstruction. 112 Finally, federal courts appear poised to
give up on school desegregation. The Supreme Court has
struck down a number of school desegregation plans aimed at
achieving equality in educational opportunity.113 In a new era
110 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see also Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L.
REV. 381 (1989) (analyzing the narrative threads in Croson). Adarand and Croson have
been used to invalidate affirmative action programs in higher education. See, e.g.,
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 940-41 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996)
(holding that the affirmative action admissions program of the university violated the
constitutional rights of White applicants); Gruetter v. Bollinger, No. 97-CV-75928,
2001 WL 293196, at 23-29 (E.D. Mich. March 27, 2001) (invalidating Michigan law
school's affirmative action policy and concluding that racial diversity is not a compel-
ling state interest). But see Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1188, 1201
(concluding that the "Fourteen Amendment permits University amdissions programs
which consider race for other than remedial purposes, and educational diversity is a
compelling governmental interest that meets the demands of strict scrutiny of race-
conscious measures.").
M" See e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 924 (1996) (dis-
cussing the Court's "unarticulated recognition of a new substantive due process right
to 'color-blind' districting itself") (Stevens, J. dissenting). Effective enforcement of the
Voting Rights Act will become especially crucial during the upcoming redistricting
battles based on the 2000 census. See also BELL, supra note 26, at 628-26 (discussing,
inter alia, the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Harris, supra note 5, at 1994 (describing the
dramatic effect on minority voting participation after the enactment of the Voting
Rights Act).
112 Indeed, the Voting Rights Act of the Second Reconstruction was necessitated
by harsh state efforts through law and intimidation to deny African Americans their
right to vote. See generally BELL, supra note 26, at 580-85 (discussing the use of poll
taxes, literacy tests and racial gerrymandering to dilute Black votes). See also Bush v.
Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000). The NAACP and other civil rights groups have recently
filed a voting rights lawsuit on behalf of African American voters in Florida following
the 2000 election. NAACP and National Civil Rights Groups File Florida Voting Rights
Lawsuit to Eliminate Unfair Voting Practices, Jan. 10, 2001, available at
<<http://www.naa cp.org/communications/press-releases/florida/01102001.asp.>>
113 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v.
Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); see also Ho v.
San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 965 F. Supp. 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that a
desegregation order designed to dismantle a historically segregated school system
now discriminates against Chinese Americans); Yamamoto, supra note 109, at 821-86
(analyzing Ho case).
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of de facto school segregation based on race, national origin,
and class, these cases reflect an accelerating retreat from the
Second Reconstruction's call to eliminate racial discrimination
"root and branch."1 14
Most disturbing, the equal protection and voting rights
cases discussed above mark the resurrection of the century-old
distortion-of-reality approach for denying minority civil rights
reflected in the Civil Rights Cases.115 In 1883, the Court struck
down the first set of federal civil rights laws enacted to protect
African Americans from segregation in public facilities.116 De-
spite stark discrimination, the Court concluded that federal
civil rights laws could not trump the social rights of Whites
and that, in any event, civil rights preferences for African
Americans were no longer necessary and unfairly discrimi-
nated against Whites. 117 Then, as now, the Court's civil rights
jurisprudence denied the realities of ongoing discrimination
against minorities.
114 Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, Va., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968). In
Green, the Supreme Court recognized that,
school boards .. .were ... clearly charged with the affirmative duty to
take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. The
constitutional rights of Negro school children articulated in Brown I
permit no less than this; and it was to this end that Brown II commanded
school boards to bend their efforts.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992) ("[lIt must be
acknowledged that the potential for discrimination and racial hostility is still present
in our country, and its manifestations may emerge in new and subtle forms after the
effects of de jure segregation have been eliminated."); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,
558-59 (1979) ("[W]e also cannot deny that, 114 years after the close of the War Be-
tween the States ... racial and other forms of discrimination still remain a fact of life,
in the administration of justice as in our society as a whole. Perhaps today that dis-
crimination takes a form more subtle than before. But it is not less real or perni-
cious.").
115 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
' See id. at 26.
n7 See id. at 25.
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent leg-
islation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there
must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the
rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws,
and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordi-
nary modes by which other men's rights are protected.
Id.; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602, 620-27 (2000) (relying on Civil




Title VII is a key provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the most important federal legislation outlawing employ-
ment discrimination. As with the current challenge to section
602 of Title VI in Sandoval, a plaintiff's ability to successfully
challenge employment discrimination under Title VII is also
under attack. In its recent rulings, the Court has narrowed the
reach of Title VII.
Specifically, in the 1990s, the Court abandoned two decades
of precedent and significantly increased the plaintiff's burden
of proof in disparate treatment cases under Title VII. In St.
Many's Honor Center v. Hicks,118 the Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiff's claim of racial discrimination even though he estab-
lished a prima facie case and demonstrated that the defendant's
proffered reasons for the discrimination were false. According
to the Court, if the defendant produces some reason for the dis-
criminatory action, it is not enough that the plaintiff show that
reason to be false or illegitimate; the plaintiff must prove racial
motivation. 119 This holding fails to recognize that contempo-
rary racism, both intentional and subconscious, is often dis-
guised.120
The import of the landmark disparate impact case, Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.,121 which recognized that even ostensibly neu-
tral practices could be violative of Title VII if they discriminate
in effect, has also has been seriously undermined. In Wards
Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio,122 the Court imposed a new
burden on plaintiffs by requiring that they identify "a specific
or particular employment practice that has created the dispa-
rate impact under attack." 123 The Court's stated concern was
that employers may be held "liable for 'the myriad of innocent
causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the composi-
118 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
119 Id. at 508. This Court confirmed the reasoning of the district court that, "'al-
though [respondent] has proven the existence of a crusade to terminate him, he has
not proven that the crusade was racially rather than personally motivated."' Id. at 508
(citation omitted).
121) See infra Section Il.B.2 (discussing how discrimination actually occurs).
121 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
122 490 U.S. 642 (1989). In Wards Cove, the Court rejected the disparate impact
claim by primarily Filipino and Alaskan native cannery workers that they were over-
represented in lower paid cannery jobs. Id. at 647-61.
123 Id. at 657; see Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a
New Theory of Racial Discritniation, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1884 n.445 (2000) (discussing
impact of Wards Cove).
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tion of their work forces."' 124 This reference to "innocent
causes" effectively imports into Title VII disparate impact doc-
trine an intent requirement and suggests that racially dispro-
portionate results do not indicate racial discrimination. 125
c. Title VI
Court rulings interpreting Title VI further reveal the hasten-
ing erosion of America's commitment to civil rights enforce-
ment. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,126 the
Court determined that Section 601 of Title VI proscribes only
those racial classifications that violate the Equal Protection
Clause-that is, only those that satisfy the intent-to-
discriminate requirement.127 As discussed. later, amici support-
ing the State of Alabama in Sandoval now argue that under
Washington v. Davis, the Court should recognize a Title VI, Sec-
tion 602 violation only if the plaintiffs prove actual intent to
discriminate. 128
2. Indirect Challenges to Federal Authority Over the
States With Far-Reaching Consequences for Civil Rights
Enforcement
Present-day civil rights retrenchment has accelerated with
the expansion of states' sovereign immunity under the Elev-
enth Amendment and the bolstering of "states' rights" through
restrictions on Congress' Commerce Clause power-the Su-
preme Court's "new federalism." 129 This sharp restriction on
124 Wards Cove, 401 U.S. at 657. (citation omitted).
125 See Haney Lopez, supra note 123. Attacks have also been launched against
court-ordered measures providing remedies for proven discrimination under Title
VII. Oftentimes, challenges have been driven by claims that such measures adversely
impact "innocent whites." See generally Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding
that White firefighters who had failed to intervene in earlier employment discrimina-
tion proceedings could collaterally challenge employment decisions taken pursuant to
consent decrees).
12 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
127 438 U.S. at 287; see also United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732 (1992) (re-
stating that the reach of Section 601 of Title VI extends only as far as the Fourteenth
Amendment). In Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comnin'n, Justice White, along with four
other Justices recognized that in Bakke, "Title VI on its own bottom reaches no further
than the Constitution." 463 U.S. 582, 589-90.
128 See Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation and Center for Equal
Opportunity in support of Petitioner, Nov. 13, 2000, at 5-11, Alexander v. Sandoval (No.
99-1908).
129 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that federal gov-
ernment cannot commandeer state officials to enforce federal laws); City of Boerne v.
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federal power has eroded the ability of individuals to hold ac-
countable states that openly or covertly discriminate. 130
In recent cases, the Court has eviscerated congressional au-
thority to abrogate states' sovereign immunity. It has solidified
its new federalism by narrowly construing Congress' Com-
merce Clause authority and Congress' enforcement powers un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent Congress from
waiving states' sovereign immunity from private suits in both
federal and state courts. 131 As a consequence, a private citizen's
monetary remedy for state-sponsored discrimination that vio-
lates federal civil rights legislation is sharply limited. The rem-
edy is available only if the discriminating state has consented
to suit and the federal legislation survives judicial scrutiny un-
der section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.132 These two
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (determining that federal government may not exercise
its power to criminalize conduct in a manner that "contradicts vital principles neces-
sary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance"); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (invoking distinction between "what is truly na-
tional and what is truly local" to hold that Congress' Commerce Clause authority
does not include a general police power akin to that retained by the states); Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (declaring that the sovereignty retained by the
states in the Tenth Amendment includes the "primary authority for defining and
enforcing the criminal law") (citation omitted); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 155-159 (1992) (reifying principles of structural federalism). See generally Jenna
Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying tle Court's "Unsteady Pati": A Theory of
Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1995); Stephen Gardbaum,
Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795 (1996); Richard E. Levy, New
York v. United States: An Essay on tMe Uses and Misuses of Precedent, History, and Policy in
Determining tile Scope of Federal Power, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 493 (1993); Laurence H.
Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rig/its to
Essential Governmental Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977). But see Bush v. Gore, 121
S. Ct. 525 (2000) (holding that state supreme court's interpretation of state election law
presented a federal constitutional question).
1m See Mitchell F. Crusto, Tie Supreme Court's "New" Federalism: An Anti-Rights
Agenda?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 517 (2000) (arguing that the Court's new federalism
encroaches upon constitutionally-protected civil rights); Richard E. Levy, Federalism:
The Next Generation, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1629 (2000) (analyzing the impact of the
Court's new federalism on the Reconstruction Amendments and the spending power).
i31 See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (clear statement abro-
gating states' sovereign immunity unconstitutional exercise both of Congress' Com-
merce Clause authority and, under the Fourteenth Amendment, of its section 5 power
to enforce equal protection clause); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (Congress
lacks authority under the Commerce Clause to subject non-consenting states to suit in
state courts); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999) (abrogation of state sovereign immunity in Patent Remedy Act
invalid exercise of Section 5 authority to enforce Due Process Clause); Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Congress lacks authority under the Indian
Commerce Clause to subject non-consenting states to suit in federal courts).
132 See, e.g., Kimnel, 528 U.S. at 81 ("'i[there must be a congruence and proportion-
ality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end,"' quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). Thus, to survive
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preconditions will rarely, if ever, be simultaneously met.133 For
example, in its most recent pronouncement, Board of Trustees of
the University of Alabama v. Garrett,134 the Court held that be-
cause Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act was not
"appropriate legislation" to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause, state sovereign immunity barred disabled Americans
from recovering money damages under the Act for state spon-
sored discrimination. 135 Moreover, even where congressional
authority exists, the Court's "new federalism" eviscerates civil
rights protections because a state that harbors no qualms about
discriminating in the first instance will not likely consent to
suit against it for its acts of discrimination.
The practical effect of the recent resurgence of states' im-
munity from suit is that the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth
Amendment are rapidly withering as the constitutional sources
authorizing the enactment and enforcement of federal civil
rights laws against the states.136 This modern judicial preclu-
sion of private redress for violations of federal civil rights laws
harkens back to-and, indeed, expressly relies upon-cases
crucial to the demise of the First Reconstruction. For example,
in United States v. Morrison,137 the Court recently struck down
the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act
that provided a federal claim for gender-motivated acts of vio-
lence. As authority for its holding, the Court cited two cases
crucial to the demise of the First Reconstruction, Harris and the
Civil Rights Cases, for the broad proposition that the Fourteenth
judicial scrutiny under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, civil rights legisla-
tion must redress a "widespread pattern of... discrimination in this country" against
whatever group the legislation seeks to protect and must not be "so out of proportion
to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as respon-
sive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." Id. at 82 (quoting Flores,
521 U.S. at 531-32); see also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955
(2001) (holding that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act not "appropriate
legislation" under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and that remedies author-
ized under ADA are neither congruent nor proportional to the purported constitu-
tional violation); College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 675-87 (determining that state's activi-
ties in interstate commerce did not amount to consent to suit nor waiver of sovereign
immunity); Levy, supra note 133.
133 See, e.g., Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (Title I of Americans with Disabilities Act inva-
lid exercise of section 5 authority to enforce equal protection clause); Kinel, 528 U.S.
62 (abrogation of state sovereign immunity in Age Discrimination in Employment Act
invalid exercise of section 5 authority to enforce equal protection clause); College Sa.
Bank, 527 U.S. 666.
13 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
135 Id. at 968.
136 See Crusto, supra note 130; Levy, supra note 130.
137 121 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
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Amendment does not reach private interactions, even though
those "interactions" have significant nationwide impact.138 In-
voking those clearly anti-civil rights cases as precedent high-
lights the Court's contemporary retreat from federal civil rights
enforcement and signals its willingness to accept an expanding
array of discriminatory acts.139
Also contributing to the civil rights retrenchment are recent
Commerce Clause cases redefining the meaning of "interstate
commerce." In United States v. Lopez, 140 for example, the Court
rejected the prior broad aggregation test for Congress' Com-
merce Clause power in favor of a much stricter, particularized
"substantial effects" test. The Court then found that the specific
subject of the law at issue- regulating gun trafficking in a
school-zone-did not have a substantial affect on interstate
commerce, and it therefore found the law an unconstitutional
exercise of congressional authority.
These cases and others signal sharply diminished congres-
sional power under the Commerce Clause to address national
problems of discrimination and violence. They thereby indi-
rectly, but importantly, contribute to the hastening demise of
civil rights enforcement in America. Indeed, observers worry
that the next Commerce Clause attack will invalidate individ-
ual discrimination claims under the important Public Accom-
modations section (Title II) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A
pending case, United States v. Nelson,141 is already challenging
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause to enact
criminal civil rights laws. This challenge, says one commenta-
tor, "very directly threatens the heart of civil rights protections
in America. If [the law] were held to be an unconstitutional
exercise of congressional power in light of this new reading of
the commerce clause, then the federal government will have
lost one of its principal remedies to protect civil rights."1 42
13 Id. at 1755-59.
139 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v.
Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135 (2000) (discussing Morrison and noting that the
Court's application of its new federalism defined states' responsibility to protect indi-
viduals' right to equal protection narrowly and, further, prevented federal legislation
to protect equality rights in an area that the states have inadequately protected).
140 514 U.S. 549 (1995). But see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that a federal civil remedy for private discrimination in pub-
lic accommodations was a constitutional exercise of Commerce Clause authority be-
cause of its aggregate effect on interstate commerce).
141 No. 98-1437 (2d Cir. 2000) (appeal pending).
142 Jeffrey Ghannam, Serving Up Civil Rights, 87 ABA J., Feb. 2001, at 48 (quoting
Martin Karlinsky, chair, Anti-Defamation League).
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II. MULTIRACIAL RESISTANCE AND RECONSTRUCTION
The attack on civil rights may very well intensify. Theodore
Olsen, the new Solicitor General who represented President
Bush in the election case as a private attorney, has led the anti-
civil rights attack in recent years. Additionally, with the back-
ing of conservative think tanks and scholars, Robert Bork and
Abigail Thermstrom, he headed the offensive in the Supreme
Court's Rice v. Cayetano case that now jeopardizes all Native
Hawaiian programs, including the very Hawaiian Homelands
program mentioned at the outset of this article. 143 And, Attor-
ney General Ashcroft's strident anti-civil rights record speaks
for itself.144
So what is to be done? How are communities from different
places concerned about genuine equality and justice, often
separated by boundaries of race, culture and national origin, to
stem the conservative attack on civil rights and to rejuvenate
the Second Reconstruction? There are many possible responses.
We address two. The first concerns collective process: How do
progressives build the multiracial, cross-boundary alliances
needed to not only stem the attack but also reconstruct the Re-
construction? The second concerns substance: As part of that
revitalization, what do we collectively fight for?
A. Multiracial Alliances
One essential part of resistance and reconstruction lies in
143 See Bruce Dunford, State-finded Programs Benefitting Native Hawaiians Chal-
lenged, PRNEwSWIRE, Feb. 15, 2001, available in 2000 WL APWIRES; Dunford, Olsen As
Solicitor General Could Impact Hawaiians, PR NEWSWIRE, available in 2001 WL APWIRES.
I" A staunch opponent of gun control and abortion and proponent of the death
penalty, most recently Ashcroft led a partisan attack in the Missouri Senate last year
against the confirmation of a prominent, moderate African American jurist to the
federal bench. See John Solomon, Demtocrats Target Ashcroft Views on Race, Civil Rights,
REC. N. N.J., Dec. 28, 2000, at Al. Describing his voting record during his term in the
United States Senate as "abysmal" and questioning whether he would carry out his
function as top law enforcement officer of the nation's civil rights laws, a broad coali-
tion of civil rights groups opposed his nomination to the post of Attorney General.
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law Urges Rejection of John D. Ashcroft as At-
torney General of the United States, Jan. 22, 2001 available in 2001 WL 4139263; Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights Views as 'Deeply Troubling' Ashcroft Nomination to be Attorney




the challenging task of forging lasting cross-boundary alli-
ances. It is those larger progressive coalitions, with a critical
edge, that can do the heavy intellectual and frontline activist
work in the courts, legislatures, city halls, schools, and
churches. Given the probability of the next twenty-year conser-
vative federal judiciary, without these alliances, the efforts to
dismantle civil rights will not only persist, they will prevail.
How do progressives forge these civil rights alliances? We
described the task as "challenging." "Daunting" may be more
appropriate. Today, we see two colliding impulses in our
communities. One impulse is the desire of groups to build
cross-boundary, and particularly interracial, alliances. The
other impulse, amid demographic shifts, is to distrust "others,"
to doubt their motivations and question their actions.
How then are diverse communities to deal with this com-
plex, dissonant reality -a movement toward needed intergroup
alliances characterized partially by anger and distrust? As
framed, the question is one that many of us prefer to avoid. It
airs dirty laundry, offering no clear, affirming answers. Never-
theless, the question is one we must answer in order to build
effective alliances-those that do not splinter under fire be-
cause of internal dissension. To deal forthrightly with the dis-
sonant impulses, we need to develop sharper ways to handle
the deep group-on-group grievances that underlie many super-
ficial face-to-face dealings.
This means, first, we must assess common goals and inter-
ests- such as resisting each attack on civil rights, whether or
not "our group" is directly targeted. Recall Sandoval. Though
specifically about newcomers, Sandoval affects all concerned
about civil rights enforcement. This also means we must grap-
ple with what we see and hear but do not often discuss. Amid
changing demographics, groups desiring to work together
sometimes are stymied by deep group-to-group (often past but
lingering) grievances held against one another. Often we are
not even aware of the wounds. Yet it is group grievances, real
and perceived, that often get in the way of forging effective
alliances.
The question then is not so much "Can we all get along?,"
but rather "How do we all get along?" To ground this question,
let us turn to Seattle and a fragile coalitional effort in support
of civil rights. In July 1999, 6,000 journalists of color congre-
gated in Seattle. Four journalist associations-African Ameri-
can, Hispanic, Native American and Asian American-met to
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deal with the media's reporting on civil rights and its role in
shaping race issues. They also sought to forge larger industry
alliances among themselves and with progressive Whites and
environmentalists to counteract discrimination and racial
stereotyping in the media.
Despite general agreement about disproportionate White
control over the media and despite many cooperative efforts,
simmering grievances among the associations threatened to
turn disagreements about specifics-how to respond to Wash-
ington's anti-affirmative action initiative - into intergroup fires.
The escalating sense of mistrust ("Are they just out for them-
selves?") and grievance ("They've taken advantage of us be-
fore") threatened their larger effort to collectively shape the
tenor of race and civil rights understandings in America-all
before the conference even began.145
So the question becomes, "How do our progressive
communities build relationships, reconciling grievances where
needed, in order to live together peaceably and work together
politically?" And here, the "communities" we refer to are not
only defined by race. They are also defined by national origin,
class, gender, sexual orientation and disability-the many
communities disadvantaged by the broad-scale attacks on civil
rights described earlier.146 Even more specifically, then, the
question is, "How do we develop the concepts, language and
methods our differing communities need both to identify
common interests and to deal with intergroup grievances in
ways that build effective political relationships?" Indeed, how
could 6,000 journalists, attempting to coalesce and powerfully
shape public civil rights understandings in America,
themselves avoid fracturing along the subsurface fault lines of
race, culture and national origin? Professor Yamamoto was
asked at that gathering to speak with some of the journalists
about these very questions. The response from many was
compelling. We want to get together. We need to get together.
"How," they asked, "do we do this"?
One suggestion we offer is that progressives, collectively,
focus both "out there" and "in here." The "out there" focus is
115 See Eric K. Yamamoto, Synposimn: The First National Meeting of the Regional
People of Color Legal Scholarship Conferences: Celebrating Our Emerging Voices: People of
Color Speak: Healing Our Own, 20 B. C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 101 (2000).
146 See, e.g., Danielle Kie Hart, Same-Sex Marriage Revisited: Taking a Critical Look at
Baehr v. Lewin, 9 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 1 (1998); Trina Grillo & Stephanie M.
Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Inplications of Making Comparisons
Between Racism and Sexism (Or Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397 (1991).
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one of the ways that economic power, politics and social per-
ception shape the "racial order" in any given locale and in
American society generally.147 The focus "out there" thus
jointly analyzes the systematic attacks on civil rights, as re-
flected in Sandoval. It searches out common interest in strug-
gling against these ongoing attacks and thereby offers a target
of collective resistance. But that is not enough.
The focus "in here" needs to be on mutual understanding of
sometimes similar, sometimes differing group histories of
struggle against discrimination as well as current racial condi-
tions. It is also a focus on understanding group cultural prac-
tices. It is a focus on addressing and, where needed, healing,
real and perceived intergroup wounds that get in the way of
building alliances. It is thus a focus on the difficult dynamics of
relationship-building among diverse groups harmed by racism
and struggling to remake a fundamentally skewed social order.
In other works, Professor Yamamoto calls this aspect of the
alliance-forging process interracial justice. 148 For this brief ex-
ploration, we will not describe here how this concept draws
from disciplines of law, theology, social psychology, ethics,
political science, and indigenous group communal healing
practices. Nor will we explain the methodological framework -
a framework marked practically by four Rs: Recognition, Re-
sponsibility, Reconstruction and Reparation. 149
We do, however, emphasize the significance and difficulty
of intergroup efforts to cross-boundaries, sight common goals,
deal with internal grievances and build relationships- all with
an eye toward forming the deep and effective alliances needed
to stem the attacks on civil rights and rejuvenate the Second
Reconstruction.
B. Redefining Discrimination
Resistance and reconstruction engage both process and sub-
stance. What we are fighting for is to reinvigorate the spirit of
the Reconstruction and to end discrimination in all its forms.
147 See CLAIRE KIM, BITTER FRUIT (2000) (describing the generation and mainte-
nance of a "racial order" in the U.S.). We are using the term "racial order" here as
shorthand for social structural ordering that also encompasses intersecting influences
of gender, class, national origin, sexual orientation and disability.
14 See, e.g., ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND
RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 10-11 (1999) (describing the frame-
work of inquiry).
149 See id. (describing the framework of inquiry).
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Many substantive efforts are needed. Paramount among them
is the redefinition of unlawful discrimination. 5 0 With one im-
portant exception, the law defines discrimination as an indi-
vidual actor's intentional differential treatment of those simi-
larly situated. 51 However, that definition, with its "intent"
component, does not accurately reflect how discrimination ac-
tually occurs in many instances. The one exception to this re-
strictive legal definition is found in section 602 of Title VI. Sec-
tion 602, as earlier interpreted by the Supreme Court, allows
federal agencies to promulgate regulations to prohibit acts by
federal contractors that have "disparate impacts" on the basis
of race or national origin. 5 2 No proof of discriminatory intent
is required to state a section 602 claim for injunctive relief.153
The State of Alabama in Sandoval now seeks to abolish this
one remaining "exceptional" understanding of discrimination.
Sandoval speaks to the heart of civil rights law- how discrimi-
nation actually occurs.
1. The attempt to abolish a private right of action to
enforce agency disparate impact regulations under section 602
of Title VI in context.
The agency regulations under section 602 of Title VI, pro-
viding a federal private right of action for disparate impact dis-
crimination claims, are the last legal refuge for private redress
of institutionalized forms of discrimination. As previously dis-
cussed, judicial acceptance of direct challenges to federal civil
rights legislation, such as Title VII, section 601 of Title VI, and
constitutional challenges to protective legislation enacted un-
der the Equal Protection Clause have undermined effective en-
forcement of anti-discrimination laws. By "harmonizing" Title
VII and section 601 of Title VI with the Court's Equal Protec-
tion Clause jurisprudence to require a showing of "intent" to
discriminate, the Court has sharply retracted the civil rights
gains of the Second Reconstruction. Indirectly, the Court's
"new federalism" 
-strengthening the doctrine of state sover-
150 Another important substantive issue for civil rights in the new decade is con-
ceptualizing and acting upon "reparations as a civil right." See RANDALL ROBINSON,
AMERICA'S DEBT 201-234 (1999); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese A meri-
can Redress and African Arnerican Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477 (1998).
151 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
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eign immunity and, correlatively, restricting Congress' author-
ity under the Commerce Clause and enforcement powers under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment-has chipped away
states' accountability to both the federal government and pri-
vate individuals.
Taken together, these direct and indirect challenges signify
a pivotal retreat from the promises of the Second Reconstruc-
tion. In this context, section 602 of Title VI is crucial; it repre-
sents the last remaining harbor for enforcing agency disparate
impact regulations. As discussed below, if the Court bars pri-
vate rights of action and applies its strict Equal Protection "in-
tent" requirement to claims brought under section 602, neither
the individual victims nor federal agencies will be able to chal-
lenge federally-subsidized disparate impact discrimination.
2. Preserving a private right of action to enforce agency
disparate impact regulations under section 602 of Title VI is
critical because the "intent" standard fails to identify and
redress how discrimination actually occurs.
A decision for the State of Alabama in Sandoval will elimi-
nate every individual's right to challenge patterns of "disparate
impact" discrimination under Title VI. As discussed above,
disparate impact claims were integral to the hard-earned con-
gressional and executive commitment to civil rights enforce-
ment.1 4 That commitment to civil rights, however, has been
largely undermined by successful challenges to both federal
legislation and constitutional protections. In Washington v.
Davis the Supreme Court eliminated legal redress for most in-
stitutionalized discrimination by requiring a showing of actual
"intent."155 In Bakke, the Court imported the strict Equal Protec-
tion intent standard to claims brought under section 601 of Ti-
tle VI.156 Then, in Wards Cove, the Supreme Court severely un-
dermined the principle of disparate impact under Title VII.157
At the same time, an elaborate network of sophisticated
conservative organizations worked to undermine affirmative
action, institute "English-only" laws and advance anti-
immigration measures. What was once an aggressive legal
commitment to civil rights enforcement has become in the eyes
154 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
155 See Washington v Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242-44 (1976).
156 See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-91 (1978).
157 See Wards Cove Packing, Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-58 (1989).
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of many subordinated Americans, another Broken Promise.
And section 602 of Title VI -the last remnant of that commit-
ment to civil rights that authorizes disparate impact civil rights
enforcement-is now under attack.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Sandoval on disparate im-
pact claims brought under section 602 of Title VI is therefore
crucial. If the Court imposes the strict "intent" standard on
claims brought under that section, the most pervasive forms of
racism experienced by communities of color will go undetected
because the intent standard fails to acknowledge that discrimi-
nation.
More specifically, the intent standard is ineffective to rem-
edy continuing inequality and racial disparity because it fails to
reflect how a large part of discrimination actually occurs.' 58 By
treating racism as an isolated phenomenon resulting from the
bias of a sole actor rather than as a socially constructed and
historically-influenced dynamic, the intent standard denies the
historic reality of race in America.15 9 Indeed, as Professor
Charles R. Lawrence III queried:
Does the black child in a segregated school experience less
stigma and humiliation because the local school board did not
consciously set out to harm her? Are blacks less prisoners of
the ghetto because the decision that excludes them from an all-
white neighborhood was made with property values and not
race in mind?16°
By requiring a specific showing of intent, the court has placed
many forms of racism beyond legal redress.
Substantial empirical and theoretical research in the fields of
social psychology, cognitive psychology, and organizational
sociology has demonstrated that much of society's racism is not
a series of unconnected, intentional acts, but a collective and
often subconscious institutional and historical process. 161 Ac-
cording to this vast body of empirical and theoretical research,
"intent" - previously viewed as connected only to blatant or
calculated acts-is linked to institutional structures, subcon-
scious categorization, and information processing.162
1 Krieger, supra note 90, at 1181; see also Lawrence, infra note 160, at 319.
15 BELL, supra note 26, at 136-44.
160 Charles R. Lawrence III, The ld, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319 (1987).
161 Krieger, supra note 90, at 1187-88.
162 Id. at 1188, 1216 (citing, inter alia, David L. Hamilton, A Cognitive-Attributional
Analysis of Stereotyping, in 12 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2, 53,
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a. Social Cognition and Subconscious Discriminatory
Motivation
Studies in social cognition reveal that humans rely on cate-
gorization as a basic tool for interpreting perceptions, encoding
those perceptions into memory, and making both conscious
and subconscious decisions based on those perceptions and
memories. 163 "[T]he normal human mind cannot possibly no-
tice, let alone analyze and use, every bit of social information it
encounters." 164 Because the amount of potential information is
overwhelming, adult minds become exceptionally able to
screen, sort, and store information.165
Individuals ordinarily process information very quickly and
efficiently through shortcuts or "cognitive strategies." 166 "Di-
viding up the social world into categories is an example of a
cognitive strategy." 167 Because of this efficiency, individuals
are "generally unaware of their own mental processes and are
unable to report the true reasons for their behavior." 168
In particular, "stereotyping" is a cognitive strategy that al-
lows the mind to interpret information very quickly. 169 It is a
normal and ordinary form of categorizing engaged in by all
people as part of the sorting and organization needed to man-
age large quantities of information. 170 As Professor Krieger ex-
plains, individuals give substance to a stereotype by creating a
prototype of the typical category member based on "a person's
accumulated knowledge, beliefs, experiences.., and expectan-
cies." 171  This culturally-generated prototype, or "social
64 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1979)); John A. Barth, Conditional Automaticity: Varieties of
Automatic Influence in Social Perception and Cognition, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 3
(James S. Uleman & John A Bargh eds., 1989)); see also Lawrence, supra note 160.
163 Krieger, supra note 90, at 1187-90 (citing Eleanor Rosch, Human Categorization,
in STUDIES IN CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1-2 (Neil Warren ed., 1977); David E.
Rumelhart, Schemata and the Cognitive System, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION
167 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 1984)).
164 Judith Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employ-
ment Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the judicial Dialogue, 46
EMORY L.J. 1487, 1494 (1997).
165 Id.
166 Id. (citing SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 11 (1984)).
167 ld; see also Krieger, supra note 90, at 1187-88.
16 Brown, supra note 164, at 1494 (citing Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp
Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84
PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 231-59 (1977)).
16 Krieger, supra note 90, at 1188-90.
170 Id. at 1187-88 (citing W. Edgar Vinacke, Stereotypes As Social Concepts, 45 J.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 229, 241 (1957)).
7 Id. at 1199; see also ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND
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schema," operates as a filter that biases "in predictable ways
the perception, interpretation, encoding, retention, and recall of
information about other people." 172
As a result of this stereotyping process, people perceive
members of outgroups to be different from those in the in-
group, or an "undifferentiated mass." 173 Generally, an individ-
ual subconsciously assigns favorable traits to his or her own
group and disfavorable traits to outgroups or "others." 174 In
addition, people recall negative behavior of outgroup members
and tend to favor ingroup members in the allocation of re-
wards.175 Information that does not correspond with the mental
prototype is subconsciously rearranged or reorganized accord-
ing to systemic biases, resulting in judgments that tend to favor
those seen as ingroup members and disfavor outgroup mem-
bers even in the absence of blatant prejudice, ill-will or ani-
mus.1
76
This filtering process is cognitive and is therefore part of the
actor's motivation for acting. Yet, the filters operate even with-
out specific intent to favor members of a particular social group
at the "moment of decision." 177 As Professor Krieger has ex-
plained, these filters bias a decisionmaker's judgment long be-
fore that decisional moment, and most importantly, they often
operate beyond the reach of decisionmaker self-awareness -
hence, the subconscious discriminatory motivation.
RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 90-97 (1999) (attributing that sub-
stance-giving largely to culture).
172 Krieger, supra note 90, at 1188, 1200 (citing Shelley E. Taylor & Jennifer
Crocker, Schematic Bases of Social Information, in 1 SOC. COGNITION 89 (E. Tory Higgins
et al. eds., 1981)).
For example, when meeting someone for the first time, individuals rely
on categories and distinctions already at their disposal, rather than ac-
tively formulating new ones. Once individuals perceive that the person
they are meeting belongs to a specific social group, their reactions may be
dominated by this single characteristic; and they may fail to notice other
important facts about the person.
Brown, supra note 164, at 1495 (citing Ellen J. Langer, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONTROL
135-36 (1983).
17 Krieger, supra note 90, at 1192 (citing Edward E. Jones, George C. Wood &
George A. Quattrone, Perceived Variability of Personal Characteristics in In-Groups and
Out-Groups: The Role of Knowledge and Evaluation, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 523, 523-24 (1981) (other citations omitted)).
174 See Brown, supra note 164, at 1494 (citing JOHN C. TURNER, SOCIAL IDENTITY
AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 17, 30 (Henri Tajfel ed., 1982)).
175 Krieger, supra note 90, at 1191-1192 (citing John W. Howard & Myron
Rothbart, Social Categorization and Memory for In-Group and Out-Group Behavior, 38 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 301, 302-03 (1980)).
176 Krieger, supra note 90, at 1191-92, 1216.
17 Id. at 1188.
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In essence, "people continually use cognitive shortcuts-
exaggerations, oversimplifications, generalizations-to allow
them to prioritize and, in some gross way, make sense of the
overload of incoming information." 178 Racial stereotyping is
one method that people employ almost automatically in order
to understand their surroundings. As social cognition studies
reveal, even individuals who recognize that racial stereotyping
is unsound are still aware of-and still influenced by-those
stereotypes. There is little likelihood, therefore, that in a com-
plex institution all or even most of the various individuals with
input into decision-making processes will manage to eliminate
from their perceptions, memory processes and ultimate deci-
sions the influence of deeply-ingrained cultural and institu-
tional stereotypes.
b. Organizational Sociology and "Institutionally-Intended
Discrimination. "
Organizational sociology and institutional racism theory
similarly have concluded that discrimination, a form of oppres-
sion, can be built into institutional structures.179 Actors within
these structures deliberately act according to established insti-
tutional norms and practices that sometimes reflect discrimina-
tory beliefs. For example, not long ago, the practice of racial
and gender exclusion in private clubs was justified by club
members who "had nothing against Blacks or women" but who
merely were upholding traditional club practices. More par-
ticularly, the discrimination that some groups suffer results not
from the tyrannical acts of a dominant ruler but from the daily
practices of a generally well-intentioned society -
discrimination "embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and
symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutional rules and
the collective consequences of following those rules." 8 0 Even if
individual actors believe they harbor no ill-will toward others,
they may by their deliberate actions carry out the institution's
discriminatory operations, which are rooted historically in dis-
criminatory stereotypes. When those actors are also aware that
carrying out an institutional practice may have racially dis-
criminatory effects, they are acting with at least subconscious
178 Brown, supra note 164, at 1496.
179 Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of
Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000).




Institutional racism theory also "stresses how racial institu-
tions ... operate as taken-for-granted understandings of the
social context that actors must adopt to make sense of the
world ... ,,18 As part of the institutional structure, "persons fail
to recognize their reliance on racial notions, and indeed may
stridently insist that no such reliance exists, even while acting
in a manner that furthers racial status hierarchy."' 8 2 Organiza-
tional sociologists thus observe that discriminatory human be-
havior within institutions often does not occur at a high level of
consciousness -that is, much of the behavior is not explicitly
purposeful. 8 3 It is, however, subconsciously purposeful in that
it stems from the deliberate yet "unconsidered repetition of
cognitively familiar routines."184 In other words, "we often act
in definable ways without a consciously formulated purpose,"
because the institution's practices and norms tell us that this "is
'the way it is done,"' and how it is done comports with our
subconscious beliefs.185
Cognitive and social psychology and organizational sociol-
ogy confirm that the intent standard is inadequate to remedy
the true conditions of inequality experienced by those most
subordinated because it does not reflect how a large part of
discrimination actually occurs. By treating racism as isolated
and intentional rather than institutionalized and historical, the
intent standard denies the reality of race in America. This is a
primary reason why section 602 of Title VI is vital.
CONCLUSION
Alexander v. Sandoval is significant because it embodies Ala-
bama's effort to knock out a critical part of the civil rights edi-
fice of the Second Reconstruction -individual victims' right to
181 Ian F. Haney-Lopez, supra note 179, at 1827.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 1723.
184 Id. (citing PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 54 (1966)). Research in
"New Institutionalism" theory also demonstrates that
routinized sequences of behavior eventually come to define normalcy, or
more broadly, reality. Established constellations of action are seen but
not noticed, relied upon but not considered, to such an extent that they
become natural-'the world of daily life known in common with others
and with others taken for granted.'
Id. at 1723-24 (footnote omitted).
1s5 Id. at 1723.
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sue states and businesses receiving federal money for disparate
impact discrimination. In a historical context, Sandoval is also
significant because it signals another potentially pivotal retreat
from America's commitment to civil rights for all, and particu-
larly those suffering most from historic forms of discrimina-
tion. As this article has explained, over the past twenty years,
piece by piece, a divided Supreme Court has dismantled civil
rights. The United States is on the verge of a second broken
civil rights promise-the dismantling of the Second Recon-
struction of the 1950s and 1960s.
For those committed to genuine equality, we endorse a dual
strategy of multiracial resistance (against that dismantling) and
reconstruction (for revitalizing the Second Reconstruction).
One part of that strategy is the challenging task of forging last-
ing cross-boundary alliances. It is those larger progressive coa-
litions, crossing lines of race, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation and disability, with a critical edge, that can contrib-
ute to the heavy intellectual and frontline activist work in the
courts, legislatures, city halls, schools and churches. As ex-
plored, those alliances are often fraught with tension. Progres-
sives need to pay close attention to the dynamics of alliance-
forging, including identifying common goals, jointly analyzing
social-economic-legal structures and tending to intergroup
grievances.
A second part of the strategy of resistance and reconstruc-
tion is substantive. It entails reconceptualizing and rearticu-
lating, persuasively, key components of the Second Reconstruc-
tion. One such component, discussed in this article, is retooling
the law's understanding of how discrimination actually occurs
in contemporary society. Discrimination now often assumes
subtle forms, residing in facially neutral institutional practices
and policies that are discriminatory in impact. This discrimina-
tion often occurs without evil-hearted individual actors but as a
result of subconscious stereotyping and group-biased decision-
making at multiple levels of institutional operations. New stud-
ies in cognitive psychology and institutional sociology confirm
this fact. Crucial to revitalizing the Second Reconstruction is
rebuilding legal definitions of discrimination to reflect this
reality.
If the United States breaks its second civil rights promise,
the societal cost will be steep -continuing inequalities and
deepening social divisions. The soft rhetoric of colorblindness
will not hide these hard realities. For this reason, we close this
[Vol. 31:523
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article with a call first to cross-boundary resistance to the dis-
mantling of civil rights and then to revitalizing the Reconstruc-
tion for the betterment of all.
CODA
As this article was going to press, the Supreme Court ren-
dered its decision in Sandoval. As anticipated, the Court
eliminated a private right of action under Section 602 of Title
VI. Alexander v. Sandoval, No. 99-1908, slip op. at 17 (April 24,
2001). The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, pre-
cludes individuals from suing to enforce federal agency dis-
criminatory impact regulations. As developed in the article,
this ruling hastens the judicial dismantling of civil rights in
America and intensifies the call for multiracial resistance and
reconstruction.

